Did the NRM fulfill the Ten Points Program?

One big political question is always: Did the ruling party live up to its promises?

The NRM adopted the following Ten Point Program in 1984 which is their famous government program until today:

  1. Restoration of democracy;
  2. Restoration of security;
  3. Consolidation of national unity and elimination of all forms of sectarianism;
  4. Defending and consolidating national independence;
  5. Building an independent, integrated and self-sustained national economy;
  6. Restoration and improvement of social services and rehabilitation of war-ravaged areas;
  7. Elimination of corruption and misuse of power;
  8. Redressing errors that have resulted in the dislocation of some sections of the population;
  9. Co-operation with other African countries;
  10. Following an economic strategy of a mixed economy.1

Let’s check them point by point

Point 1:

It is no secret that Museveni is generally seen as a dictator, not just within Uganda but also all over the world. There are a few reasons for it:

First of all, he seized power by a coup (like every president in Ugandan history, including Obote).

Second, he ruled Uganda for a decade without any formal elections at all. Museveni seized power in 1986 but there were no presidential elections until 1996. In 1995 Uganda even adopted a new constitution, which is in effect until today. The legitimacy of this constitution therefore could also be put into doubt.

Third, in 2005 the term limit was abolished so that Museveni could get reelected in 2006. Nota bene that he had to amend his own constitution for that. Museveni used to make the promise to step down several times, but never kept it2. There is no talk of it anymore. Since that step in 2005 at least the Western countries that used to support Museveni and his neoliberal reforms started regarding him as a dictator.

Fourth, Museveni is accused of electoral fraud, especially for the 2021 presidential election. Even when this allegation would prove to be untrue, it still shows a massive lack of trust by the Ugandan people in him as the legitimate ruler of Uganda.

Fifth, the handling of the 2024 strikes have shown that Uganda is, like a Muganda told me, is “a military regime with some pseudo-democratic coating”. Similar opinions came up when Besigye was arrested earlier this year. Museveni himself said in 1989 in an interview with the “Time” magazine, when he was asked if by 1990 civilian rule would be restored: “We said democracy. We didn’t say civilian rule.”3 This shows that Museveni did not even try to cover it up.

Of course I heard several times the view by Ugandans: “Uganda needs a dictator, otherwise the country falls apart.” But none of them favored Museveni.

No matter what, we cannot seriously talk about democracy in Uganda beyond a formal point. Uganda´s political system could be compared to that in Russia or Belarus where one dominant ruling party with one decade-long president at least formally allows the opposition to legally exist, without any chance of real political influence.

Point 2:

This point is somewhat fulfilled, when you see it from a purely military point of view. But it must also be said that it was the NRM starting a civil war against the Obote II government, which caused insecurity in the country. So it is not an improvement, it is just a return to peace. When it comes to security from crimes, then the work of the NRM by long is not done. The police is corrupt and often ignores crimes when the affected can not bribe them. And even when bribing them, it is no guarantee that the police will do something.

Point 3:

This point is for sure connected to Museveni´s principle of patriotism4. But this point is void of a real strategy to overcome tribalism and creating a shared national identity. It is not as if Uganda has no national identity at all, there are things, especially the modern ones that affect everyone, such as the use of social media, the fast food culture with rolex and chapati as pinnacle, but there is a lack of fusing the different local ethnic cultures into a shared national culture.

Hans Jonas once wrote:

Cultures can best mix when the thought of each has become sufficiently emancipated from particular local, social, and national conditions to assume some degree of general validity and thereby become transmissible and exchangeable.”5

The Ugandan national culture, which exists to some extent, fulfills these criteria, but not the local ethnic cultures.

Tribalism is still one big issue in Uganda. There are Ugandans that are not tribalist, which is for sure the reason why Uganda does not fall apart like the Congo. Still, elections are often overshadowed by tribal preference over actual political content. Even the electoral results of the NUP in 2021 show very clearly that Bobi Wine was mainly voted in Buganda, which is not a wonder because he is a Muganda.

The hatred and friendship among tribes differs obviously from tribe to tribe. The biggest issue in Uganda seems to be Baganda chauvinism though because Baganda seem to see themselves as the main ethnic group of Uganda (though there is no majority ethnic group in Uganda) and disregard other ethnic groups, even when they are related (like the Basoga).

The NRM had almost four entire decades of time to do something against it, but the results are not there. These tribalist issues already existed during the time of Uganda’s independence and have been unsolved since. It is still a task for the future.

Point 4:

The formal national independence of Uganda has not been threatened since 1962. The real threat to Uganda’s national independence comes from economic dependency, which would be more suitable for the next point.

Point 5:

Is it a secret that Uganda’s economy is not independent? I think not. The Ugandan economy on the industrial sector is dominated by Chinese and Indian companies obviously and on the beverage sector from the typical two American monopoly companies: Coca Cola and Pepsi. Foreign capital flows into Uganda and that should not affect its independence? The industrial parks of Uganda are dominated by Chinese companies, the sugar industry is dominated by Indian companies and the national resources, like gold deposits, are in the hands of Chinese companies as well. The state companies of the Obote era are gone since the privatization wave of the 90s.

To modernize Entebbe International Airport a loan over 200 million Dollars was being granted by the Export-Import Bank of China6 for which probably the airport, which is by the way Uganda´s only international airport, was probably taken as mortgage. Museveni admitted in December 2021 to Reuters that Chinese companies invest in Uganda while Western companies lost interest, but denied that the airport was set up as a mortgage7.

Uganda´s national debt compared to the GDP was 50% in the year 20218, which is actually not too bad. Just as a comparison: The German national debt compared to the GDP was 62.9% in 20239. The main problem in Uganda is less the state debt (though it should not be lost out of sight of course), but the economic dominance of foreign companies, of imperialist monopolies. This is what makes Uganda a semi-colony of China. Without own national companies it is impossible to be independent, because the country as such does not produce and innovate on its own.

Point 6:

The restoration from war is obviously reached. But that is nothing special since it was the NRM who started the civil war that damaged Uganda a second time after it started to regenerate from Idi Amin´s destructive and economically ruinous fascist dictatorship under the Obote II government. There is no merit in it.

Regarding social services there is much to complain about obviously, but there is one main shiny example that is a speed bump in Uganda´s entire development: There is de facto no free compulsory school system. Article 30 of the 1995 Constitution of Uganda says: “All persons have a right to education.” How can you have a “right to education” when education costs money, money which many people cannot afford? In Germany the Prussian Constitution of 1850 had a similar issue: Article 25 said that education in the public elementary school (Volksschule – people´s school) would be for free10, but in fact the people, especially on the countryside, had to pay school fees to the teachers to attend the lessons until the early 20th century. Because of the burden of upbringing school fees, in 2014 90% of the children in Uganda enrolled into P1 but only 40% finished P711. That means that not even half of the children finished elementary school.

A country without free compulsory school education can only hardly develop because there are many people that lack even the most basic formal education. That issue can be seen in Uganda today where still many people, especially in the rural areas, cannot speak proper English despite it being the official lingua franca at the national level. This blatant issue in one of the social services (and as mentioned, this is just one of many to complain about) does not only work as a speedbump for the development of the economy, where education comes in handy very much, but also in the development of a Ugandan nation. People that cannot communicate with each other in a shared language cannot form one nation, as Stalin already pointed out12.

Where are the NRM´s merits in this field? They are nowhere to be seen!

Point 7:

Is corruption eliminated today? No, it is not. Even Museveni himself openly admits that Uganda is corrupt. He admitted it for example in his statement to the boycott by the World Bank in 202313. Now it is only talked about “combating corruption” because the “elimination” was given up obviously. And where are the results? I think that every Ugandan can answer that question for himself.

The misuse of power mentioned is tightly connected. I think that point 1 is enough on the political side of this, since without democracy there is no control of power.

Point 8:

This point was connected to the civil war as well and is nowadays obsolete.

Point 9:

The cooperation with other African countries was dampened down a lot to just East African economic integration effectively, although Museveni might still call it “Pan-Africanism”14. On this these words by Frantz Fanon seem like a prophecy:

African unity, that vague formula, yet one to which the men and women of Africa were passionately attached, and whose operative value served to bring immense pressure to bear on colonialism, African unity takes off the mask, and crumbles into regionalism inside the hollow shell of nationality itself.”15

What Museveni actually pursues in practical politics is East African regionalism. I will not even judge him for his “treason to the cause” here. Pan-Africanism was always just a fiction, just like Pan-Europeanism. Besides that, the cooperation between the East African countries is based on capitalist relations as the East African Community (EAC) shows. It is just a bootleg of the EU in Europe. There is no true cooperation of these countries and its peoples, only between companies.

Point 10:

Can Uganda be called a “mixed economy”? The private sector is obviously completely dominant after the mass privatizations of the 90s. Museveni even attacked Obote for nationalizing private companies16. Uganda´s economy is nothing more than bareback neoliberalism. Museveni´s principle of “socio-economic transformation” also shows that he wants to turn Uganda into a fully capitalist society only. With that everything could be said, because the Ugandan state obviously has no power over the economy anymore since it has privatized its state companies. But there is some ideological background by Museveni that needs to be mentioned.

Our society has been metamorphising from a traditional to middle class, from pre-capitalist to a fully monetised economy, from Third World to First World.”17, Museveni wrote in “Sowing the Mustard Seed”. This quote has several issues. As it seems, it is not about the status quo but a rather vague future perspective, because nobody knows when this will become the reality of Uganda.

To the first claim: Museveni claimed in June 2022 that Uganda reached “middle income status” with 1.046$ GDP per capita18, which is pretty much believed by nobody except himself. The World Bank estimation for Uganda for the same year was just 840$ GDP per capita19, which is very obviously hundreds of Dollars below and means that Uganda is a “low income country”. It can be argued that the World Bank would underestimate Uganda a bit maybe, but it must also be taken into account that the UN calculation border for “middle income” is 1.045$. It is for sure no coincidence that Museveni just claims to be one Dollar above that border.

To the second claim: It is obvious that on the countryside Uganda’s economy was and still is to a big extent still feudal or subsistence agriculture, though the capitalist sector also became dominant there. Museveni himself delivers the data that in 2002 only 32% of Ugandan agriculture was part of the “money economy” (that means: the market economy) while 68% were still stuck in subsistence agriculture20. In 2021 the number of peasants that engaged in subsistence agriculture was 39%21, which means that over two decades the number was reducing a lot, though it is still high. It is not a majority anymore.

To the third claim: It is obvious that Uganda is developing and therefore is transforming from a “Third World” to a “First World” country over time. But if the mentioned 30 years timespan of Museveni22 is a realistic schedule is not just impossible, it is outright ridiculous. Just as ridiculous as the demand for 10% annual economic growth23 while Uganda has only a growth of about 6% on average per year.

Is it therefore a wonder, that Moses Kayz Osiya wrote on 26th January 2025 in an article for the Daily Monitor that the NRM did not live up to its Ten Point Program24? He just spoke out what all know, just like I spoke out what all know in a bit more detail.

I also found online that the NRM adopted at a party conference in Jinja in July 1999 further five points25. They are not just very unknown among the common Ugandans, even Museveni did not mention them in “Sowing the Mustard Seed” at all. The people of Uganda know that these Ten Points were never actually fulfilled, so why should they bother about even more empty words?

This question is also directed towards comrades who are not very interested in digging deeper into the NRM´s propaganda, because they see through its demagogy. Stalin said: “We must thoroughly know the enemy.”26 Ignorance does not help us in analyzing the current situation. But without analysis of the current situation our actions become blind. We can learn from the NRM as a negative example, just as Mao learned from his opponents as negative examples27. That will enrich our experience and make it easier for us to draft correct policies.

Our job is not just to show where the NRM did not keep its promises but mainly how we will do it better in comparison to them.

1Yoweri Kaguta Museveni “Sowing the Mustard Seed”, Moran Publishers, Nairobi 2019, p. 319

4Yoweri Kaguta Museveni “Sowing the Mustard Seed”, Moran Publishers, Nairobi 2019, p. 290

5Hans Jonas “The Gnostic Religion”, Beacon Press, Boston 1958, p. 4

14Cf. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni “Sowing the Mustard Seed”, Moran Publishers, Nairobi 2019, p. 290

15Frantz Fanon “The Wretched of the Earth”, Grove Press, New York 1963, p. 159

16Cf. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni “Sowing the Mustard Seed”, Moran Publishers, Nairobi 2019, p. 307

17Ibidem, p. 305

20Cf. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni “Sowing the Mustard Seed”, Moran Publishers, Nairobi 2019, p. 317

22Cf. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni “Sowing the Mustard Seed”, Moran Publishers, Nairobi 2019, p. 290

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